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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
V. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual 
Defendant-Respondent 
And 
Supreme Court No. '-I 'f 1 '1.l 
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County. 
HONORABLE D. DUFF MCKEE, District Judge presiding. 
JAMES F. JACOBSON 
Residing at Boise, Idaho, for Appellant 
MICHELLE R. POINTS 
Residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent. 
PY 
JUL 3 1 2017 
/ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID JOHNSON, and individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
SCOTT H. LEE, , an individual, DRUG 
TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, VURV, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
BO W." and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a 
married couple, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, Jacobson & Jacobson, 
PLLC, and hereby submits Reply Brief. 1 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Crossett's arguments surrounding the issues of this case brought up on appeal, 
are (1) consistently contradictory and conclusory, and (2) fail to apply the appropriate legal 
standard, whether statutory or case law based, to the facts of this case. As such, he has failed to 
show that the District Court (1) correctly applied the facts of this case to the appropriate legal 
standards, (2) did not commit multiple prejudicial errors in law as outlined in Appellants' Brief, 
(3) did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion for new trial due to said prejudicial 
errors as outlined in Appellants' Brief, and (4) did not err in granting Defendant Crossett 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) as outlined in Appellants' Brief. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court reverse (1) the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' 
motion for new trial and (2) the district court's award of attorney's fees to Defendant Crossett, 
and remand this action to the district court for further proceedings consistent therewith. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant Crossett's arguments regarding the District Court's treatment of his 
admission and its denial of the motion for new trial are contradictory and 
conclusory. 
1 As Plaintiffs do not provide any new authorities in this brief in addition those listed in Table of Cases 
and Authorities submitted with their Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs do not provide a list of cases and 
authorities in this brief. For a fully detailed list of cases and authorities that support Plaintiffs' arguments, 
please refer to the Table of Cases and authorities submitted as part of the Appellants' Brief. 
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Defendant Crossett's arguments surrounding his admission and the denial of the motion 
for new trial are consistently contradictory and conclusory. Defendant Crossett's erroneously 
argues (1) that an oral agreement existed between the parties that signing the written operating 
agreement was a condition precedent to membership in DTC Group, and (2) that DTC Group 
was a single-member LLC with Defendant Crossett as its sole member. 
Initially, Defendant Crossett argues that the District Court's treatment of his admission in 
the pleadings was not erroneous because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy a condition precedent to 
becoming a member-that is signing the drafted, written operating agreement. See Respondent's 
Brief, p. 6-7. However, this argument raises multiple problems for Defendant Crossett. 
First, Defendant Crossett fails to provide any evidence that any such condition precedent 
ever existed. There is no qualification in Defendant's admission in his pleading and no evidence 
in the record of any oral agreement with a condition precedent. Yet, throughout his brief, 
Defendant Crossett refers to this alleged condition precedent. See Respondent's Brief, p. 8, 
11-12. This argument seems to be an attempt to explain the District Court's finding that the 
simple drafting of the proposed written operating agreement superseded any previous oral 
agreements between the parties. (See R000081-000083). But, rather than make an effort to 
show why the District Court's finding was correct through evidence in the record or through 
statutory or case law, Defendant Crossett simply presumes that the District Court's findings was 
correct. Such an argument is conclusory and not based on any facts or evidence. 
Furthermore, this argument is contradictory as Defendant Crossett himself did not sign 
the written operating agreement, and therefore also did not satisfy this claimed condition 
precedent. Defendant Crossett alleges that "[Plaintift] Johnson and [Defendant] Crossett formed 
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DTC Group, and orally agreed that becoming a member in DTC was contingent upon signing a 
written operating agreement." Respondent's Brief, p. 8. Yet, Defendant Crossett did not sign the 
written operating agreement himself. It seems disingenuous that, on the one hand, Defendant 
Crossett argues that an alleged oral agreement between the parties required signing the written 
operating agreement as a condition precedent to becoming a member of DTC Group, and then 
claim to be a member when he failed to satisfy this alleged condition precedent. Carried to its 
logical conclusion, Defendant Crossett's argument that the written operating agreement had to be 
signed for any person to become a member of DTC Group means that DTC Group was an LLC 
with no members. 
Next, Defendant Crossett claims that Plaintiffs were not members of DTC Group as it 
was a single-member LLC from its inception, and therefore the District Court did not err in 
either ignoring Defendant Crossett's admission nor in its denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a new 
trial. However, Defendant Crossett again fails to provide any evidence, either in the record or in 
the law, to support his conclusion beyond conclusory statements in the District Court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Again, rather than make an effort to show why the District 
Court's finding was correct through evidence in the record or through statutory or case law, 
Defendant Crossett simply presumes that the District Court's findings was correct. On the other 
hand, Plaintiffs' brief provides ample evidence, in both the record and that law, that DTC Group 
was never a single-member LLC and that Plaintiffs were members from the inception of DTC 
Group. See Generally Appellant's Brief. Like Defendant Crossett's previous argument 
discussed above, such an argument is conclusory and not based on any facts or evidence. 
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Furthermore, this argument contradicts other statements Defendant Crossett makes in his 
brief. First, it is contradictory to argue that DTC Group was a single-member LLC on the one 
hand, and then later claim that Defendant Crossett "was to receive a guaranteed distribution of 
$60,000 to $65,000 per year." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. If DTC Group is, and always was a 
single-member LLC, there would be no need for an agreement that Defendant Crossett would 
receive a guaranteed distribution each year. The fact that there was a "guaranteed distribution" 
agreed upon for Defendant Crossett presupposes that other members of DTC Group were also 
owed a distribution. And, as only members can receive a distribution (See I.C. §§ 30-25-102(3), 
30-25-102(11 )), it also presupposes that there are more members besides Defendant Crossett. 
Therefore, it is contradictory to argue, on the one hand, that DTC was a single-member LLC with 
Defendant Crossett as the only member, and then later argue that there was an agreement that 
Defendant Crossett would receive a guaranteed distribution each year. 
This argument also contradicts Defendant Crossett's reasoning behind his admission in 
the pleadings. Defendant Crossett claims that it is "untenable" and "frivolous" to argue that "if 
[Defendant Crossett] really thought he was the only member then he could only deny" the 
allegation in the pleadings. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. However, it stands to reason that, if 
Defendant Crossett truly believed, as he so vigorously argues in his brief, that he was the only 
member of DTC Group from its inception and continued to be its only member throughout its 
history up until its dissolution, he would clarify that he is "the" member of DTC Group, not just 
"a" member. As such, it is neither untenable nor frivolous for Plaintiffs to make such a claim, 
especially when one considers the law surrounding admissions in pleadings. See Knowles v. New 
Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 Idaho 217,229, 101 P. 81, 85-86 (1908), reversed on other grounds, 
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Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 Idaho 235, 101 P. 81 (1909) ("Admissions made in a 
pleading are denominated solemn admissions and are not required to be supported by evidence 
on the part of the adverse party. Such admissions are taken as true against the party making 
them, without further proof or controversy."). 
B. Defendant Crossett's areuments fail to apply both statutory and case law standards 
in his areuments.2 
Like the District Court in its ruling, Defendant Crossett fails to appropriately apply the 
statutory and case law standards surrounding the issues in this case. First, Defendant Crossett 
argues that the District Court did not err in its treatment of his admission in the pleadings 
because "[t]here is a difference in a group of people forming a company and becoming a member 
of a limited liability company." Respondent's Brief, p. 7. However, this ignores the clear 
standard set by the legislature in Idaho Code Sections 30-25-401 and 30-25-102(a)(9). See I.C. § 
30-25-401 (stating that founders "become members as agreed by the persons before the 
formation of the company" and that organizers, like Defendant Crossett, act on behalf of the 
founders.); I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9), cmt. (showing that when founders agree to join their activities 
by the formation of an LLC, they become the initial members of the LLC "without further ado or 
agreement."; Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-16. Defendant Crossett cites to no law or legal standard 
which supports his assertion. In contrast, Plaintiffs provide ample law to support their assertion 
that, as founders, they were the initial members pursuant to an oral operating agreement and that 
2 The purpose of this section, and of this brief in general, is to point out the flaws in Defendant 
Crossett's arguments. It is not to simply rehash the law and arguments Plaintiffs outlined in detail 
in the Appellants' Brief. Plaintiffs believe that the arguments and legal standards in the Appellant's 
Brief speak for themselves and that a full restatement of the law in this section would be a waste of 
this Court's time. Therefore, Plaintiffs' statements of the law in this section will be brief, and will 
refer summarily to the more detailed arguments set forth in the Appellants' Brief. 
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the written operating agreement was meant to be an amendment to the oral operating agreement. 
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-19. However, the written agreement was never executed, and 
therefore cannot be applied to this case. 
Next, Defendant Crossett argues that it is "untenable" and "frivolous" to argue that "if 
[Defendant Crossett] really thought he was the only member then he could only deny" the 
allegation in the pleadings. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. However, as discussed above, this is 
counter to the clear standard Idaho courts have set for the treatment of admissions in pleadings. 
Again, Defendant Crossett provides no legal support as to why his admission should be treated 
differently than how Idaho case law explains it should be treated, let alone any support for his 
claim that Plaintiffs' argument is "frivolous." 
Defendant further argues that the Idaho Code does not apply to Plaintiffs because the 
District Court found that Plaintiffs were not members of DTC Group. Respondent's Brief, p. 9. 
This is a conclusory argument similar to Defendant Crossett's arguments discussed in the first 
section of this brief. Like the District Court, Defendant Crossett fails to apply the clear 
standards set forth in Title 30, Section 25 of the Idaho Code which exclusively details the 
treatment of limited liability companies in the law. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-19 (showing 
that proper application of the Idaho Code to the facts of this case establishes that the District 
Court committed prejudicial errors in law and abused its discretion). 
Finally, Defendant Crossett argues that the District Court did not err in granting him 
attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) because Plaintiffs did not "get to" the 
statutory penalties as the District Court found that they were not members of DTC Group. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 14-17. Defendant Crossett seems to believe that the standard for what 
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comprises a commercial transaction is based on the ruling and not what is the gravamen of the 
lawsuit. See Id This is a clear misstatement of the legal standard for attorney fee actions brought 
under the commercial transaction clause of Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). The standard for such 
attorney fee actions is a determination of whether the commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the action. See Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,471, 
36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001) (quoting Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 426, 987 P. 
2d 1035, 1041 (1999)); Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631, 903 P.2d 1321, 1328 
(1995); Gumprecht v. Doyle, 128 Idaho 242, 245, 912 P.2d 610, 613 (1995).3 It is not whether 
the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the ruling or outcome of the case. As this 
action was brought to enforce statutory penalties, it is not considered a commercial transaction 
under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). See Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-26. Like many of Defendant 
Crossett's other arguments, this one simply concludes that the District Court was correct without 
any effort to show why it was correct. And, like the District Court, Defendant Crossett failed to 
apply the appropriate legal standard to attorney fee actions brought under the commercial 
transaction clause ofldaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Crossett's arguments in his Respondent's Brief are largely contradictory, 
conclusory, or fail to apply the appropriate legal standard to the issues in this case. In short, 
Defendant Crossett failed to establish that the District Court correctly applied the law to the facts 
3 It is odd, considering the vast amount of case law establishing and defining this standard, that 
Defendant Crossett neither cites to any of the cases nor mentions this standard in his Respondent's 
Brief. 
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of this case with regards to the issues brought up in this appeal. Indeed, it is clear, as detailed in 
the Appellant's Brief, and based on application of the facts of this case to the appropriate legal 
standards, that the District Court (1) committed multiple prejudicial errors in law and abused its 
discretion by denying Plaintiffs' motion for new trial due to said prejudicial errors; and (2) erred 
in awarding attorney's fees to Defendant Crossett under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court reverse (1) the district court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' motion for new trial and (2) the district court's award of attorney's fees to Defendant 
Crossett, and remand this action to the district court for further proceedings consistent therewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 2017 
JACOBSON &.JACOBSON, PLLC 
By,~~ 
fames F. Jacobson./ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of July, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
DATED this 31st day of July, 2017. 
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[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[X] iCourt/email 
[ ] Facsimile 
By: 
